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INTRODUCTION 
 
Most of my audit experience comes from an audit of the purchasing and payables 
functions of the Acquisition Department in 1987. This was the first audit since 
implementation of the INNOVACQ system in 1984. The audit was of particular 
importance to us because we are a satellite accounts-payable operation on campus. 
We issue our own purchase orders and are allowed to mail out our own checks 
though the checks are issued centrally [1]. As a result of that experience I did some 
research on the auditing process in the business literature. As a beginning, let me 
make three statements about auditing: 
 
1. If you understand the concepts behind auditing and if you educate yourself 
just a bit, you can pass an audit without major problems. 
No one teaches us about auditing in library school. So it is imperative that 
you learn about this process on your own. Armed with that knowledge, 
examine your operation and correct any major problems with your 
organization, security, or automated system. 
2. If you use an INNOVACQ Acquisitions System, you can pass an audit 
without major problems. 
I did a joint workshop at NASIG in 1992 with Sandy Weaver Westall of III. 
Sandy's part of that presentation was to discuss what a vendor does to 
ensure the integrity of their accounting functions. She focused particular 
attention on the importance of what many of us take for granted —that the 
system can add and subtract correctly and keep track of the integrity of 
every financial transaction. That is no small feat for a program, though 
most of us take that portion of our systems for granted.  
3. Despite your best efforts, no automated acquisitions system will ever be 
secure enough for an auditor. An auditor must find something wrong to 
recommend for change during the audit. 
Auditing is really about risk. How much risk is the library or your 
institution willing to take? Some things are required, like separation of 
functions, which we shall discuss briefly later. However, because of budget 
constraints and the complexities of purchasing library materials, your 
system will never be as secure as the auditor would prefer. Your parent 
institution will have requirements that must be met; you will have to 
determine how much risk to absorb in the "gray," less well defined areas. 
 
OSU passed its audit with flying colors in 1987. However, the primary 
issues during that audit, which involved the automated acquisitions system, were 
password security and the segregation of functions, maintenance of signature files, 
and the retention of information. There were other minor nonautomated issues, but 
our focus is on the system issues. 
 
PASSWORD SECURITY AND SEGREGATION OF FUNCTIONS 
 
Let me begin with password security and the segregation of functions by 
quoting directly from the Audit Report we received in 1987: 
 
... we noted that 78 percent of the employees' system authorizations tested allowed access 
to INNOVACQ functions that are incompatible. ... By providing excess authorizations, 
the department creates an exposure to unauthorized or erroneous transactions [2]. 
 
Audit standards require the segregation of three functions: purchase order 
preparation, receiving, and invoice processing and payment. Although it is more 
difficult to ensure adequate segregation in a small organization, as long as the 
organization or department has at least three employees, segregation can be 
maintained. In essence, the person who placed the order should not be the person 
who receives it or the person who pays for it. In practice, this may seem relatively 
easy to achieve. Within an automated system it may become more difficult to 
achieve if the password structure is too flexible. For example, even though the staff 
member who issues orders may not be responsible for receiving material, if his 
password allows him to receive material (or even update the receipt date), 
segregation of functions has been violated. 
Some individuals argue that systems are secure because staff members 
have not been "trained" or instructed in the procedure for something, even though 
their passwords allow it. That is a flawed argument in this context because the 
issue is what it is possible for staff members to do within the system, not what 
activities you have trained them to perform. We do not "train" anyone to perpetrate 
fraud by issuing payments to him/herself. Audit control requires our automated 
systems to prevent that fraud from occurring, not just to rely on the integrity of our 
employees. 
At OSU, the auditors prepared the grid shown to illustrate the principles of 
segregation that they wished us to employ in our password structure (Table 1). The 
table includes the function, examples of appropriate tasks, and examples of 
inappropriate tasks. Much of this is relatively easy to secure. Even though the 
initial report indicated a 78% level of lax security, much of that was the result of 
failure on our part to review carefully and confine the password structure. Much of 
that was eliminated by reexamining the passwords for each person and confining 
them to specific tasks. 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 1 
UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PROPOSED SYSTEM FOR TASK ALLOCATIONS* 
 
This grid is to help segregate the job functions of the Department of Acquisition. To fully achieve 
the segregation needed, the department should have critical data fields in the update function 
protected. 
 
Process Functions 
Examples of 
appropriate tasks 
Examples of 
inappropriate tasks Comments 
Ordering 
Build records 
Update records 
Print PO 
Merge Records 
Cancel Records 
Data Entry 
Editing 
Print PO  
Claiming 
Delete/change 
Receive merchandise 
Change vendor 
history 
Process invoice  
Receiving Check-ins Receive merchandise 
Change or delete 
order 
Process invoices 
Change vendors 
Linited access to 
data-field should be 
considered. 
Invoice processing  
 
Process invoices 
Build fund codes 
Pay invoices 
Establish fund codes 
Generate financial 
reports 
Change or delete 
order 
Print PO  
Receive merchandise  
File maintenance - 
Level I 
Access vendor files 
Backup files 
System maintenance 
Change vendor 
history 
Backup files 
Process order 
Receive merchandise 
Process invoice 
Access should be 
listed to one person 
and supervisor or 
manager. 
Level II 
Access password 
files 
Adding or removing 
individuals to 
password file 
Process order  
Receive merchandise  
Process invoice 
Access should be 
limited to managers. 
Also, manager should 
not be involved in the 
daily job activity. 
*The Ohio State University Libraries, 1987 — prepared by the University internal auditors 
However, from our experience, the single greatest flaw in the security of 
the INNOVACQ system was the inability to segregate individual fields in the 
order record from update in the update function. For example, in the invoicing 
process, as noted on the chart, invoicing staff members should not be allowed to 
change an order. We wanted invoicing staff to have access to the update function 
for adding internal notes, vendor addresses, and changing acquisition types (thus, 
changing the order). By providing passwords that allowed them to perform these 
activities, the invoicer could also update order and receiving information such as 
receipt date (rdate) and order date (odate) —two of the key elements in the 
integrity of segregating the ordering, receiving, and invoicing processes. 
To satisfy the auditors, we wrote a formal letter of request to Innovative 
Interfaces asking that the system be enhanced to provide better security. In 
addition, we limited update functions for invoicing activities to the supervisor of 
the accounting division rather than allowing the other three invoice processing 
staff members to have these capabilities. Unfortunately, this creates some other 
risks, since the accounting supervisor also has other capabilities in the financial 
function that should be highly secured. 
A final unanticipated problem was the dial-access modem that was 
connected to the system and used for problem solving by III. The auditors 
recommended that "the dial-up modem should be off when not actively in use. 
When III wishes to access the system, permission should be granted by logging the 
request, giving the approximate time required, stating the service to be performed, 
and, if approved, activating the modem. The log should be used to document 
routine problems with the system. The use of a dial-back modem should be 
considered." [3] A dial-back modem is one that allows access to a system by 
calling back the number of the person who placed a call originally. If III dialed 
into the system, the modem would verify their right to access the system and then 
"dial back" the system and allow the access. Initially, we did abide by this 
recommendation by unplugging the modem and requiring III to call us when they 
needed to access the system. We never considered this a serious audit risk (though 
the auditor did). I will confess that we became rather lax about leaving the modem 
unplugged as time went on. 
 
SIGNATURE FILE 
 
Most of you are probably familiar with the signature-file concept 
maintained by banks. When you open an account, you sign a signature card that is 
your official signature for comparison against checks, should the situation warrant. 
Anyone else who is authorized to write checks on your account will also be 
required to sign the card. These cards are not consulted every time we make a 
transaction at the bank, but they are the official authorization documents for your 
accounts. 
One result of our audit in 1987 was the requirement that we maintain a 
signature file for every fund in our INNOVACQ system. We implemented this by 
maintaining a card for each collection manager which included the funds on which 
they were authorized to initiate purchases. After the card was completed, the 
manager was required to initial and sign the card much as we are required to sign 
signature cards at the bank. This requirement applies to every "order" placed by the 
Acquisition Department. In essence, the collection managers must authorize 
purchase of all order requests they submit; they must initial and add the fund to a 
flag that is inserted in each approval book that they select. In addition, when they 
submit approval notification slips for ordering, each slip must be individually 
initialled. 
These authorizing initials are keyed into the INNOVACQ system as online 
documentation that the order was initiated by someone outside the Acquisition 
Department. Replicating this information in the online system is only for our 
information and use; the official documentation is the actual paper forms 
themselves. After the title is received, the paper order form with the official initials 
is filed in shoe-box-like files by receipt date. The University's Internal Audit 
Department argued that: 
 
The heart of the recommendation is not the document used, but your evidence 
prior to purchase that the transaction was authorized by a party independent of 
the Acquisitions Department [4]. 
 
As you might guess, we were patently opposed to this requirement, arguing 
that our collection managers recommended titles for purchase, while the 
Acquisition Department was the actual ordering authority. The University 
Archivist and the State Auditor concurred with the library stating that: 
 
It is not necessary to retain Form 15510 as part of an audit trail. . .  if the other 
internal controls, such as receiving, cataloging, shelflist, etc. are adequate to 
protect the financial integrity of the acquisitions process [5]. 
 
You might be surprised to learn that we lost this battle even with the State Auditor 
on our side. Basically, the University is entitled to be more stringent than the State 
and can enforce greater controls (as they did in this case). Obviously, they cannot 
be less stringent than the State but they can be more stringent. 
Now, on this issue I have been talking exclusively about a manual solution 
to the signature file. I confirmed at the time of the audit that an electronic signature 
file would also suffice, though INNOVACQ did not have one at that time, nor do 
they have one at this point. Basically, an electronic signature file would be 
required in our case if collection managers were to be allowed to key their order 
requests directly into INNOVACQ rather than submitting paper forms. As a part of 
the system's password security, the collection manager would sign on with a 
password which would identify him to the system and allow him specific functions 
such as the ability to add new order requests but not initiate purchase orders. Each 
order record would automatically record and display the name of the password 
used to key the order. That field would be system-created and would not be 
updatable. In addition, the password system would go a step further and verify that 
the fund code added to the order was included in a list in the system for which the 
collection manager was authorized to make purchases. The system would not 
accept a fund code that was not authorized for the password being used. 
At OSU we have been pursuing an enhancement of this type with III for the 
INNOVACQ system (although we have not yet convinced them to provide it). We 
believe it is imperative for streamlining and paper-file elimination to move 
forward with allowing our collection managers to key their orders directly into the 
INNOVACQ system. I am also convinced that this is doable, because it was a 
integral feature of at least one other automated acquisitions system as early as 1986 
— the original Geac Acquisitions System. 
 
RECORDS RETENTION 
 
Since the University Archives and its Archivist are members of the library 
faculty at OSU, we have been able to define record retention schedules for most 
operations in the libraries. As a result of the audit in 1987, the Acquisition 
Department's schedule was updated to include not only the new paper files 
generated by the INNOVACQ system but the electronic records as well. The 
electronic order record includes basic bibliographic information,' the person 
initiating the request, the PO number, the vendor, invoice information, fund 
accounting information, date of receipt, and date of payment. Our current schedule 
reads: 
Retain 5 years after payment, then destroy, provided that audit report of State 
Auditor has been released. (Record can be transferred from electronic to paper 
medium at any time but cannot be destroyed until 5 years after payment has been 
issued and audit report of State Auditor for the period has been released) [6]. 
 
At the time of this recommendation we were deleting records from our system on a 
regular basis onto paper files. Under our current configuration with INNOVACQ 
we are deleting these records to DAT tape. Because of storage limitations, we will 
delete and store these records on tape after approximately 18 months. Should an 
audit occur on these records after they are deleted, the tapes can be remounted and 
accessed online on a title-by-title basis. They are not actually reloaded and indexed 
in the system, but are simply displayed in a workfile space for viewing and 
verification. After five years, the tapes can be discarded completely. In this regard, 
III has developed a very effective mechanism for meeting retention requirements 
while minimizing the online storage requirements and costs for libraries. Because 
we will be deleting a large set of records in the coming months as we prepare to 
implement the INNOPAC online catalog portion of the III system, we will delete 
material in categories such as gifts, theses, and paid titles. Each type of material 
will be stored on individual tapes. Also, the deleted records will occur on particular 
dates so that the type of material deleted and its location will be easier to find and 
reload. 
Two additional financial files that are part of the III system are created in 
paper format and must be retained in that fashion: the posting register and the fund 
ledgers. The posting register is created by INNOVACQ as a chronological listing 
of all payments to vendors and includes the name of the vendor, the invoice 
number and date and the purchase order number, and any disencumbrances. This 
paper documentation is created every time that the financial files are updated 
through a program known as "posting." We post twice a day, so the amount of 
paper created is substantial. These documents are kept in chronological order in 
notebooks throughout the current year for ready reference. They are retained in this 
format for five years and then destroyed [7], The second file, the fund ledgers, are 
paper records that show budget transfers and cash rollovers in each fund used to 
buy library materials. This file does not include information about individual 
purchases of library materials [8]. I would much prefer that these audit trails were 
maintained in an online fashion. In their current paper formats, they are more 
difficult to use and less accessible than they would be online. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As I have indicated above, our audit found the Acquisition Department 
process to be very clean. We lost one battle about the retention of the paper order 
forms from collection managers. The password file was tightened as much as 
possible at the time, though I expect an audit of it today would find that some laxity 
has once again crept in. The final communication from the Internal Audit 
Department reveals what I mentioned earlier, that a certain level of risk can be 
tolerated: 
 
The department has taken action to correct incompatible job functions noted 
during the audit by limiting employees' access to as few functions as possible 
without impeding departmental operations. However, additional access 
restrictions cannot be made because the INNOVACQ system is unable to restrict 
access to data fields in the update function. We understand that the vendor has 
been contacted to rectify the system weaknesses, but to no avail. Therefore, the 
department has opted to accept the risk of operating with the current system until 
the vendor can be persuaded to develop the specific enhancements [9]. 
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